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Rethinking Major League Baseball’s 
Antitrust Exemption 
Roger D. Blair and Wenche Wang*
For nearly a century, Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed antitrust immunity. 
No other sports league or organization is similarly exempt. Shielded by precedent 
from antitrust prosecution, MLB clubs are free to exploit both monopolistic 
and monopsonistic power. In this paper, we call for a repeal of MLB’s antitrust 
exemption. In doing so, we examine some recent antitrust challenges to MLB 
conduct, the current interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission in labor market issues, the welfare consequences of the exemption, and 
a policy recommendation for legislative action.
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1. Introduction
In 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes blundered badly in Federal Baseball1 by 
granting antitrust immunity to Major League Baseball (MLB). The purported 
foundation for this immunity was misguided if not actually disingenuous. The 
United States Supreme Court has had several opportunities to correct this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to this anomalous ruling in those cases where certiorari was granted.2 The 
economic consequences of MLB’s antitrust exemption are the largely unfettered 
exercise of monopoly and monopsony power by the league and its members. In 
the market for MLB players, the exemption has been legislated away by Congress 
in the Curt Flood Act, but MLB is protected by the non-statutory labor exemption 
since the players are unionized. To a large extent, MLB’s exemption has become 
irrelevant in the market for broadcast rights due to the Sports Broadcasting Act.3 
1  Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200 (1922).
2  Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
3  15 U.S.C. § 1291.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ty of law at the University of Florida; email: ??????????????. Wenche Wang, PhD, is an assistant 
professor of sport management in the School of Kinesiology at the University of Michigan; email: 
wwenche@umich.edu. Although they cannot be blamed for what follows, the authors would like 
to thank Isabelle Mercier and Ryan Rodenberg for truly useful suggestions. They also thank their 
discussant, Todd Jewell, and participants at the 2018 WEAI conference in Vancouver, Canada.
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In all other areas, however, the exemption appears to have current vitality for no 
good reason. MLB’s anachronistic antitrust exemption is unique. No other sports 
league or organization enjoys antitrust immunity. Even the NCAA is subject 
to antitrust scrutiny.4 In this paper, we review the history and development of 
MLB’s antitrust exemption. We discuss the welfare consequences due to MLB’s 
antitrust immunity. There is no principled foundation for MLB’s special status 
and we argue that it should be withdrawn.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 of this 
paper, we review the economic consequences of collusion. In Section 3, we set 
out the antitrust treatment of collusion in labor markets outside baseball. We also 
examine the current concerns of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) regarding antitrust policy in labor markets. Section 4 
focuses on the judicial foundation for MLB’s antitrust exemption. We turn to the 
current vitality of MLB’s antitrust exemption in Section 5. Section 6 explores ju-
dicial resistance to a repeal of the exemption. In Section 7, we offer an argument 
for repeal of MLB’s antitrust exemption and close with some concluding remarks 
in Section 8. 
2. The Economic Rationale for Antitrust Policy
The fundamental premise of the antitrust laws is that competitive market forces 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
absence of market failure, which may be due to externalities, public goods, or 
asymmetric information, competitive markets maximize social welfare. Thus, 
our antitrust policy appropriately aims to protect and promote competition 
through statutory provisions, public and private enforcement, and judicial 
interpretation. When there is a monopoly (i.e., a single seller) the consequences 
for consumers are familiar, higher prices and reduced output. When it comes 
to monopsony, however, the consequences are a bit less familiar. In this case, 
?????? ?????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????? ??????? ??????????????
initially counterintuitive result: lower prices paid and reduced purchases, which 
lead to higher prices for consumers.5 What generates political support for a 
vigorous antitrust policy are the prices that affect the distribution of wealth. For 
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
restrictions rather than the effect on wealth distribution. Here, we explore the 
impact of monopoly and monopsony on both income distribution and allocative 
???????????
4  National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
5  See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL LAW 
REVIEW 297 (1991), for analytical details. Also, see Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance. 
The Economics of Monopsony in W. Dale Collins, ed. Issues in Competition Law and Policy 
(2008).
20  Blair, Wang
2.1. Monopoly and its Welfare Consequences
????????? ?? ????? ??????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????? ???? ???? ???
operate where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The economic results 
are captured in Figure 1 in which D represents demand, MR is the associated 
marginal revenue, and S denotes supply, which is marginal cost. The competitive 
solution can be found at the intersection of supply and demand: price is P1 and 
the quantity is Q1. In this partial equilibrium setting,
6 our measure of consumer 
welfare is consumer surplus and our measure of social welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consumer surplus is the difference 
between the consumer’s willingness to pay and the price that he or she actually 
pays. In Figure 1, this is the area under the demand curve above (i.e., the triangular 
area ). Producer surplus is the difference between a producer’s reservation 
price and the price actually received. In Figure 1, producer surplus is the area 
above the supply curve and below P1 (i.e., the triangular area P
1bc). The sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus is a measure of social welfare. Given the 
demand and supply conditions in this market, social welfare is maximized at the 
competitive equilibrium of P1 and Q1. No other price and output will generate 
a larger social welfare. In a nutshell, this is the economic rationale for a public 
policy that promotes and protects competition.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reducing output to Q2 (where marginal revenue equals marginal cost) and raising 
price to P2?? ??????????????????? ??? ??????????????? ???????? ????????? ????????
from area abP1 to area adP2. Some of the lost consumer surplus, area P2dfP1, is 
6  By partial equilibrium,???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
markets are ignored.
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
????????
?????
?????
??
??
????????Figure 1
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of social welfare, the loss due to monopoly is equal to area dbe. This is the sum 
of the forgone consumer surplus and producer surplus from not producing at Q1.
Thus, monopoly alters the distribution of the surplus by converting some 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
But monopoly also reduces the total surplus because of the output restriction. In 
Figure 1, we can see that price exceeds marginal cost at a quantity of Q2. Too lit-
tle output is being produced because the value to consumers of an additional unit 
of output exceeds the cost to society of producing that added output. The welfare 
???????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is the economic rationale for antitrust policy. 
2.2. Monopsony and its Welfare Consequences
Monopsony leads to welfare effects that are analogous to those of monopoly. 
These effects are illustrated in Figure 2.7 Under competitive conditions, demand 
(D) and supply (S) determine a price of w1, and a quantity of Q1. Buyer surplus
8 is 
equal to area abw1, while producer surplus equals area w1bc. The sum, area abc, 
is social welfare. 
In contrast, suppose there is a single buyer, that is, a monopsonist. The mon-
opsonist can take advantage of the positively sloped supply curve by restricting 
its purchases and thereby depressing the price that it pays. To maximize its prof-
its, the monopsonist will purchase at the point where the marginal expenditure 
(ME) equals demand.9 At this reduced quantity (Q2), the price on the supply 
curve is w2. The result is a reduction in producer surplus from w1bc to w2ec. 
Part of this reduction, area w1few2, is converted into buyer surplus and part of 
it is lost. The net effect on social welfare is a loss equal to triangular area dbe.10 
Thus, the welfare results of monopsony are analogous to those of monopoly. A 
monopsonist reduces social welfare as well as producer welfare. The analogous 
value to the consumer surplus is the reduction in producer surplus created by the 
7  Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 
297, (1991).
8? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????
rather than consumers. The concept, however, is the same: the difference between the supplier’s 
reservation price and the price actually received.
9? ?????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????x, can be 
written as ? = PQ(x) – w(x)x where P is output price, Q(x) is the production function, and w and x are 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
 
The value of the marginal product, , is the demand for x while  is the marginal expen-
diture. Since  is positive, ME > w.
10  Although it may be somewhat counterintuitive, the lower price paid by the monopsonist 
does not result in lower output prices. Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance (2008), The 
Economics of Monopsony in W. Dale Collins, ed., ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, Chicago: 
American Bar Association.
22  Blair, Wang
buyer’s monopsony power.11 
3. Collusion in the Labor Market: Antitrust Policy
The cornerstone of U.S. antitrust policy is the Sherman Act, which forbids 
unreasonable unilateral conduct aimed at achieving or maintaining monopoly. 
It also forbids conspiracies among ostensible competitors that deny market 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
§1 holds that “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States … is 
declared to be illegal.”12
This prohibition was meant to preclude agreements not to compete on price, 
?????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????? ??????????? ??????????
compete for business.13
For the most part, §1 is enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice. Those found guilty of a §1 violation face stiff penalties. Corporations 
11  Supreme Court rulings, such as Mandeville Island Farms, clearly illustrate that the Court has 
long understood this parallel. In Mandeville Island Farms, sugar beet farmers complained that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
recognized that the sellers were the victims of the collusive monopsony. Mandeville Island Farms 
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). 
12  15 U.S.C. §1
13  For a brief survey, see Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics, 2nd ed. 
(2009). Also, see American Bar Association, Antitrust Law Developments, 8th ed. (2016).
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?????????? ??
?
?
?
?
??
Figure 2
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??????????????? ????????????????????????????14? ??????????????????????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????15 These are 
maximum sanctions, which are rarely imposed, but the potential is there.
In addition to public enforcement, §4 of the Clayton Act16 provides a private 
right of action to the victims of antitrust violations: “Any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue, therefor … and shall recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained.”17
????? ???? ????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ??????
sellers in its various forms has been unlawful. In its Mandeville Island Farms 
v. American Crystal Sugar Co. decision, the Supreme Court made it abundantly 
clear that collusion among buyers was equally impermissible.18
In Mandeville Island Farms?????????????????????????????????????????????????
in northern California had stopped competing on the prices paid for sugar beets. 
Instead, they offered uniform contracts to the farmers that resulted in identical 
prices. The plaintiffs contended that they received lower prices than they would 
have received in the absence of the allegedly unlawful agreement. Accordingly, 
they contended that they were entitled to recover treble damages under §4 of the 
Clayton Act.
The Court agreed with the plaintiffs:
It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the persons … injured under the treble damage claim are sellers not 
customers or consumers, … it does not follow that it is outside the scope 
of the Sherman Act.19
With this ruling, collusive monopsony became vulnerable to antitrust chal-
lenges by the antitrust agencies and by victims (i.e., the underpaid sellers). This 
antitrust policy extends to employees supplying their labor services. 
There are many contemporary examples of employer cartels that have drawn 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????-
tems, Apple, Google, Intel, and others agreed among themselves to refrain from 
soliciting one another’s high-tech hardware and software engineers, the Depart-
??????????????????????????20 In the wake of this government suit, a private damage 
????????????????21???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
employ high-tech software and hardware engineers and digital animators. In 
14  15 U.S. C §1.
15  Id.
16  15 U.S. C §15.
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 219.
19  Id.
20  United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc. 10-cv-01629-RBW (2011).
21  In re High Tech Employees Antitrust Litigation, C 11-2509 LHK. This case settled for about 
????? ???????
24  Blair, Wang
United States v. Lucas Film,22 the DOJ challenged an agreement not to poach 
????????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ?? ???????? ??????? ??????????? ?????
against Microsoft, Dreamworks, Walt Disney, and Pixar. The Duke University 
and University of North Carolina hospitals allegedly engaged in a “no poaching” 
agreement regarding their medical staff.23 In addition to the no-poaching agree-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in local markets for hospital nurses.24 Employer collusion has been found in the 
market for fashion models and au pairs as well.
3.1. DOJ and FTC Warnings
In the wake of recent episodes of collusion in the labor market, the Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission offered advice to the community 
of human resources professionals in its 2016 Antitrust Guidance for Human 
Resources Professionals.25 The advice makes it clear that the antitrust agencies 
believe that collusion among employers in the labor market is a criminal offense 
under §1 of the Sherman Act.
The DOJ and FTC began by observing that “[f]ree and open markets are 
the foundation of a vibrant economy.” They went on to observe that this applies 
to labor markets as well as product markets: “… competition among employers 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
other terms of employment.” The DOJ and FTC made it clear that employees are 
entitled to antitrust protection. They take the position that “[i]t is unlawful for 
competitors to expressly or implicitly agree not to compete with one another even 
though they are motivated by a desire to reduce costs.”26
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agreements among competing employers are per se illegal violations of §1 of 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????
Second, agreements not to solicit or hire the employees of a competitor are also 
unlawful. These no-poaching agreements have been challenged by the DOJ in 
civil cases. The DOJ plans to open criminal investigations of suspected wage 
?????????????????????????????????27
22  ??????????????????????????????? 10-cv-02220-RBW (2010).
23  Seaman v. Duke University, 15-cv-00462 (2016). At this writing, the plaintiffs have settled with 
the University of North Carolina, but the suit against Duke University continues as a class-action.
24  See for example, Cason-Merendo v. VHS of Michigan, Inc. NO. 06-15601 (2015). 
25  Available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2016/10/antitrust-guidance-human-re-
source-professionals-department-justice.
26? ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but it raises marginal costs and thereby leads to lower quantity and higher prices for consumers. 
Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, The Economics of Monopsony in W. Dale Collins, 
ed., ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (2008).
27  In April 2018, the DOJ settled a no-poaching case, Unites States v. Knorr-Bremse 1:18-cv-
00747-CKK. The agency pursued this as a civil matter because it ended before the 2016 Antitrust 
Guidance?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agreements that began or continued after the Antitrust Guidance was published.
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The bottom line is that collusion on the buying side is impermissible under 
§1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the federal anti-trust agencies have clearly 
stated their intentions to proceed with criminal prosecution when employers 
collude in the labor market. This general attitude does not apply in MLB’s hiring 
decisions due to an egregious judicial error committed over 95 years ago. We 
turn our attention to the legal history of MLB’s immunity in the next section.
4. Legal Foundation for MLB’s Exemption
Ordinarily, agreements among ostensible competitors are subject to §1 of the 
Sherman Act. For the Sherman Act to apply, however, the suspect agreement must 
involve “trade or commerce” and that trade or commerce must be “interstate” in 
character. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, these requirements were 
not met in the case that started all of the mischief.
4.1. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of 
Professional Baseball Clubs28
The National League was organized in 1876 while the American League was 
organized in 1901. The champions of each league began meeting in the World 
Series in 1903. The two leagues cooperated with one another as Major League 
Baseball. In 1922, there were 16 teams in MLB. There were eight in the older 
National League and another eight in the relatively young American League. 
Geographically, professional baseball was a concentrated affair. If one divided 
the U.S. into four quadrants in 1920, one would have found MLB concentrated 
in the northeast quadrant (see Table 1). Both leagues mandated that the clubs use 
a standard player contract that included a reserve clause. This clause provided 
that the player was obligated to play one more year for his club. In practice, the 
clause turned a one-year contract into a perpetual contract as one year rolled 
into another for as long as the club desired.29 If a player refused to abide by 
the contractual restraints, the club would be entitled to an injunction that would 
prevent the player from playing for any other professional baseball club.30
In 1913, the Federal League formed and attempted to provide competition 
for the National and American Leagues. In 1915, the Federal League folded. One 
??? ????????????? ????????????????? ????? ?????????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???
which it alleged that MLB clubs unlawfully agreed that all clubs would use the 
standard player contract with its reserve clause. All baseball players in both the 
major leagues and the minor leagues signed contracts that bound them to their 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
required to contract with his club that he would serve for one year, and would 
enter into a new contract ‘for the succeeding season at a salary to be determined 
28  Id. at 200.
29  The requirement to play one more year for the player’s current club could only be avoided by 
retiring. 
30  Roger D. Blair, Sports Economics, 73-75, (2012). 
26  Blair, Wang
by the parties to such contract.’31 It further alleged that the clause prevented the 
Federal League clubs from acquiring enough high-quality players to compete 
with MLB teams. The plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded damages of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed in favor of MLB.32 This 
decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 
The judicial misadventures at the core of MLB’s antitrust exemption began 
with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion in Federal Baseball.33 The plain-
tiff was the lone remaining member of a league that intended to compete with 
the two major baseball leagues, the National League and the American League. 
The plaintiff alleged that the National and American Leagues had conspired to 
prevent successful competition from the entrant. The Supreme Court did not 
address this issue. Instead, the plaintiff’s claim was disposed of on jurisdictional 
grounds. The Court found that “The business [of MLB] is giving exhibitions of 
baseball games, which is purely a state affair.”34
In effect, since the performance of a baseball game necessarily takes place 
in one spot, the game itself lacks the required interstate character for the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act. Justice Holmes recognized that most of the teams 
were located in different states and, therefore, the Brooklyn Robins had to cross 
state lines to play games in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. But he found that 
the transportation of teams across state lines did not carry the day for a plaintiff 
because the transportation was “incidental.”35 That is, the movement of one team 
to another state was incidental to the local performance of the baseball game. 
31  National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc, 
269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir, 1921).
32  Federal Baseball, 269 F. at 681. 
33  Id. at 200.
34  Id. at 200.
35  Id. at 200.
Table 1. Major League Baseball Teams in 1922
American League National League
Boston Red Sox Boston Braves
Chicago White Sox Brooklyn Robins
Cleveland Indians Chicago Cubs
Detroit Tigers Cincinnati Reds
New York Yankees New York Giants
Philadelphia Athletics Philadelphia Phillies
St. Louis Browns Pittsburgh Pirates
Washington Senators St. Louis Cardinals
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???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????
commerce.”36 Holmes embraced the defendants’ contention that “personal effort 
not related to production is not a subject of commerce.”37 Presumably, those who 
built the ballparks, sewed the uniforms, and manufactured the baseballs were 
engaged in commerce while those who supplied baseball entertainment, which 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ing by the Supreme Court has led many lower courts to conclude that anything 
that was considered to fall within the business of baseball was exempt from the 
Sherman Act’s jurisdiction.
In our view, the opinion by Justice Holmes has two main problems, the mis-
characterization of baseball being an intrastate affair and the misunderstanding 
of baseball not being a subject of commerce. In Toolson v. New York Yankees and 
Flood v. Kuhn, which will be discussed in the following sections, the Supreme 
Court corrected these mistakes. Nonetheless, the Court did not withdraw the 
exemption.
4.2. Toolson v. New York Yankees38
George Earl Toolson was a minor league player who was traded to another club. 
He refused to be traded and was then declared to be ineligible to play for any 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
victim of a concerted refusal to deal, in violation of the Sherman Act. In essence, 
Toolson complained about the standard player contract, which contained the 
reserve clause and an assortment of other restraints. The trial court accepted 
Federal Baseball’s???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and, therefore, the Sherman Act’s proscriptions did not apply. The Supreme 
Court agreed.
In a per curium opinion, the Supreme Court majority found that it was ap-
propriate to maintain the notion that “the business of providing public baseball 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
scope of the federal antitrust laws.”39 It is apparent that the majority’s view was 
disingenuous regarding jurisdictional issues. In his dissent in Toolson, Justice 
Burton shattered this illusion:
In the light of organized baseball’s well-known and widely distributed 
capital investments used in conducting competitions between teams 
constantly traveling between states, its receipts and expenditures of 
large sums transmitted between states, its numerous purchases of ma-
terials in interstate commerce, the attendance at its local exhibitions of 
large audiences often traveling across state lines, its radio and television 
activities which expand its audiences beyond state lines, its sponsorship 
36  Id. at 200.
37  Id. at 200.
38  Id. at 346.
39  Id. at 346.
28  Blair, Wang
of interstate advertising, and its highly organized ‘farm system’ of 
minor league baseball clubs, coupled with restrictive contracts and un-
derstandings between individuals and among clubs or leagues playing 
???? ?????? ??????????? ??????????????????? ???? ????? ??????????????????
and Cuba, it is a contradiction in terms to say that the defendants in the 
cases before us are not now engaged in interstate trade or commerce as 
those terms are used in the Constitution of the United States and in the 
Sherman Act.40
Unwilling to revisit its earlier decision in Federal Baseball, the Court point-
ed to Congressional inaction: “Congress has had the ruling under consideration, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prospective effect.”41 In other words, because Congress did not overrule Federal 
Baseball by legislative means, the Court saw no reason to correct its earlier 
misadventure.
The Court’s majority also expressed concern that professional baseball busi-
nesses had relied on the antitrust exemption for some 30 years.42 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court concluded that “… if it wanted the antitrust laws to apply to 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??????????????-
tion to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.”43
4.3. Flood v. Kuhn44
After another two decades, the Court granted certiorari??????????????????????
its commitment to its acknowledged error in Federal Baseball. Curt Flood was 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the all-time best defensive players, he was a solid hitter. With no warning and 
with no apparent concern for Flood or his family, the Cardinals traded him to 
the Philadelphia Phillies. Under the standard player contract, he had no choice 
and no say in the matter. He appealed to MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn to 
be declared a free agent and thereby eligible to negotiate with any and all MLB 
clubs. Kuhn refused to entertain an exception to the contract for Flood. 
When Flood reached the Supreme Court, the majority acknowledged that 
(1) MLB is a business engaged in trade or commerce and (2) that business is 
interstate in character. Thus, the twin pillars supporting Federal Baseball 
were gone. The Court also recognized that its decisions involving boxing,45 
40  Id. at 346
41  Id. at 346.
42  Had the Supreme Court overruled Federal Baseball, the MLB clubs arguably would have 
been vulnerable to private damage actions for their past conduct. But there should be a way for 
the Supreme Court to overrule Federal Baseball while limiting private damage actions to future 
conduct.
43  Id. at 346.
44  Id. at 258.
45  United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
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professional football,46 and basketball47 were clearly inconsistent with Federal 
Baseball. Nonetheless, the Court clung to MLB’s exemption. At bottom, there 
was no sound economic rationale or legal principle for the continuing exemption. 
In the end, however, the Court ruled that Congress had to act if the exemption 
were to be removed.48
At this point, the Supreme Court had confronted the reserve clause in Fed-
eral Baseball, Toolson, and Flood. In each case, the antitrust issue was whether 
the employers of professional baseball players could lawfully agree to impose the 
same restraint on their employees. If the decision to include the reserve clause 
in the contracts had been unilateral, there could have been no §1 violation. But 
an agreement among employers to include the identical clause in all employment 
contracts would seem to satisfy the “contract combination … or conspiracy” 
requirement for a §1 violation. If that agreement were judged to be unreasonable 
in an antitrust sense, then it would violate §1. The Court dodged this issue in 
Federal Baseball on jurisdictional grounds. This reasoning has been disavowed 
in Justice Burton’s dissent in Toolson and by the majority in Flood. 
John Paul Stevens, a former Supreme Court Justice, has pointed out that the 
Supreme Court precedents apply only to the reserve clause. 49 They do not apply 
to MLB’s dealings with umpires, scouts, broadcasters, and others doing business 
with MLB and its clubs. Nonetheless, some lower courts appear to think so.50
4.4. Curt Flood Act of 1998 51
In Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court relied on stare decisis to rationalize its 
perpetuation of MLB’s antitrust exemption. Some 50 years after Federal 
Baseball, the Court unequivocally shifted the burden of removing MLB’s 
antitrust immunity to Congress. Although Congress did not exactly leap into 
action, it did pass the Curt Flood Act, a quarter of a century after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Flood Case. This apparently bold step is largely irrelevant.
The sole purpose of the Act is to make the antitrust laws applicable to MLB 
in its dealings with MLB players. This, of course, appears to be an enormous 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ized since 1965. Consequently, the terms of employment are governed by the 
collective bargaining agreement, which should protect the players from monop-
sonistic exploitation by the clubs. Such agreements are shielded from most anti-
trust challenges by the nonstatutory labor exemption.52 At the risk of sounding 
46  Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
47  Haywood v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
48  Id. at 258.
49  John Paul Stevens. Sports Lawyers Association 41st Annual Conference Luncheon. (2015).
50  The reserve clause was killed in arbitration when Dave McNally and Andy Messersmith chal-
lenged the “ever green” interpretation of the standard contract.
51  The Curt Flood Act of 1998 amended the Clayton Act by adding a new section: 15 U.S.C. §27.
52  For a brief statement of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 
Antitrust Law Developments, 8th ed. 1495-1499 (2017). 
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cynical, we should observe that Congress failed to provide antitrust protection 
for the players until they no longer needed it.
Importantly, all other aspects of the business of baseball may still be exempt 
from the antitrust laws. The Act does not protect minor league players. Since mi-
nor league players are not unionized, they may be exposed to the monopsonistic 
agreements of the MLB owners. 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ments on the amateur draft, franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise 
ownership issues including ownership transfers, the relationship between the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
entertainment product of organized professional baseball, and the licensing of 
intellectual property as being beyond the scope of the Curt Flood Act. In addi-
tion, the Act similarly fails to protect agreements relating to umpires and others 
employed in the business of organized professional baseball.53
5. Current Vitality of MLB’s Antitrust Immunity
In spite of repeated setbacks in court, the anticompetitive conduct of MLB has 
resulted in federal antitrust suits. We begin with a brief discussion of City of San 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????54 which deals with 
restraints on the relocation of MLB franchises. We then turn our attention to 
two cases that involve monopsonistic abuse: Miranda v. Selig,55 which involved 
?? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????????????? ???????????? ??? ??????
of Commissioner of Baseball,56 which involved a no-poaching agreement for 
baseball scouts. Both challenges failed due to the continuing vitality of the Federal 
Baseball exemption. Finally, we examine ???????????????????????????????????
Baseball,57 a market allocation case that appeared to be heading south for MLB 
before the parties settled. 
5.1. Restraints on Relocation: City of San Jose v. Office of 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball
In City of San Jose, the plaintiff alleged that MLB’s restraints on the relocation of 
MLB clubs violated §1 of the Sherman Act. It is undisputed that each MLB club 
operates within its exclusive territory. The Oakland Athletics wanted to relocate 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
territory of the San Francisco Giants. As a result, the Oakland Athletics could not 
move to San Jose without the approval of at least 75% of the MLB franchises. 
53  There have been some lower court decisions involving parties and practices that are not cov-
ered by the Curt Flood Act, but there has been no Supreme Court guidance on these issues.
54  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015).
55  Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017).
56  ????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2016 U.S. Dist LEXIS 135443 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016)
57  ???????????????????????????????????????????????? 120 F. Supp. 3d 334, Dist. Court, SD New 
York (2017).
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The Athletics and the city of San Jose had struck a deal on a site for a new 
ballpark pending approval of the relocation by MLB. In 2009, MLB formed a 
committee to study the effects of the proposed relocation, but four years later, the 
committee was still analyzing the impact of such a potential move. Suspicious 
that this was just a stalling tactic aimed at preserving the Giants’ local monopoly, 
????????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ??? ??????????????????? ?????????
to dismiss on the grounds that MLB was exempt from the antitrust laws. The 
district court granted MLB’s motion to dismiss.58 The City of San Jose appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Federal 
Baseball–Toolson–Flood trilogy and found that the present antitrust immunity 
rested on two considerations.59 First, the “principle of Stare Decisis and the 
concomitant aversion to disturbing reliance interests”60 created by the exemp-
tion made the Supreme Court reluctant to overturn Federal Baseball. Second, 
Congress was well aware of Federal Baseball and acquiesced to its holding. The 
City of San Jose argued, however, that the exemption applied only to the reserve 
clause, which was at issue in the MLB trilogy.61 Therefore, the City of San Jose 
alleged that the exemption did not apply to restraints on relocation of clubs. 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. In the Supreme Court precedents, the Ninth 
Circuit found support for the proposition that the antitrust exemption applied “to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
professional baseball players.”62
The Ninth Circuit further found that “[t]he Supreme Court intended to ex-
empt the business of baseball, not any particular facet of that business, from 
the federal antitrust laws.”63 The court was persuaded that limits on franchise 
location and relocation fall squarely within the business of baseball.
“The designation of franchises to particular geographic territories is the 
league’s basic organizing principle … few, if any, issues are as central to a sports 
league’s proper functioning as its rules regarding the geographic designation 
of franchises.”64 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, therefore, the City of San Jose’s 
58  City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 686.
59  Id. at 686.
60  Id. at 686.
61  As noted above, supra note 48 and accompanying text, former Supreme Court Justice John 
Paul Stevens agreed with this position.
62  Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
63  Id. at 686.
64  Id. at 686.
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antitrust claims were properly dismissed by the district court. Thus, for decades 
after Flood, MLB’s exemption appeared to be as safe as ever.65 
The court could have interpreted the business of baseball to be the production 
of baseball games for public consumption. In that event, one could reasonably 
argue that the creation of local monopolies and their protection with relocation 
restraints are outside the business of baseball. Although creating and protecting 
??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ???????? ????????????????
baseball. The court, however, did not adopt this reasoning. 
5.2. Wage Fixing: Miranda v. Selig66
?? ??????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ????? ?? ????????????? ?????????? ?????
against MLB in 2017. In their complaint, they alleged that the members of MLB 
violated §1 of the Sherman Act in their dealings with minor league baseball 
players. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that minor league baseball players were 
required to sign a uniform player contract that contained a reserve clause. The 
court observed that 
Under the contract’s so-called ‘reserve clause,’ MLB franchises receive 
exclusive rights to their minor league players for seven championship 
seasons, approximately seven years. This provision precludes players 
from playing for any other baseball team during the contract period, 
whether or not the team is an MLB franchise. However, MLB franchises 
have the power to transfer amongst themselves their exclusive rights to 
a player at the end of each contract season.67
With no union to protect them, minor league players are paid little. During 
spring training, they may work 50-60 hours per week with no pay at all. During 
the season, their pay depends on the level of their play. According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the alleged salary scale imposed by MLB on the minor league players is 
shown in Table 2. According to the plaintiffs, most minor league players earned 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????68
65  Similarly, in Right Field Rooftops, the plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed. In their suit, the plaintiffs 
requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the Chicago Cubs from constructing a Jumbotron 
and billboards that would block the view of live games by customers of businesses across the 
street from Wrigley Field. Part of their complaint alleged that the Cubs were attempting to mo-
nopolize attendance at live Cubs games in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
enjoyed an antitrust exemption that precluded success on the merits and, therefore, an injunction 
would be inappropriate. Right Field Rooftops, L.L.C. v. Chicago Baseball Holdings, L.L.C., 87 F.
Supp 3d 874 (N.D. I11. 2015). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Right Field Rooftops, L.L.C. 
v. Chicago Baseball Holdings, L.L.C., 138 S.Ct. 2621, U.S., June 11, 2018.
66  Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017). 
67  Id. at 1239.
68? ?????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tive Bargaining Agreement, Article 6, Section A, Paragraph 1, available at http://www.mlbplayers.
com/pdf9/5450407.pdf
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Table 2. Salary Scale for Minor League Baseball Players
Class Monthly Salary
First Year $1,100
Class A $1,250
Class AA $1,500
Class AAA $2,150
Note: These data were extracted from Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Sherman Act by colluding on the uniform player contract and the minor 
league salary structure.69????????????????????????????????????????????????????
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the business of baseball is exempt from 
the antitrust laws. The district court agreed and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
sion. In doing so, the court explained that it was bound by both Supreme Court 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exemption.70
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s rulings in 
Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood as well as the language in the Curt Flood 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Act.
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for a Writ of Certiorari seeking Supreme Court review. In the petition, they 
raised three questions. First, they asked whether Federal Baseball should be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
minor league baseball players violates §1 of the Sherman Act. Finally, they asked 
whether the Curt Flood Act is unconstitutional as it denies equal protection to 
minor league baseball players from antitrust violations.
Clearly, Miranda provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to correct 
an error committed nearly 100 years ago. The Court greeted this opportunity 
with a resounding “cert. denied.”71
If the business of baseball is the production and performance of MLB 
games, one could reasonably argue that minor league operations fall outside the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agreement vulnerable to antitrust challenge. Having adopted a more expansive 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
league players, but it failed to do so.
69  In other employment settings, an agreement among employers on a wage scale would be a 
criminal violation of the Sherman Act according to the DOJ and FTC’s Antitrust Guidance for 
Human Resources Professionals.
70  Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017).
71  138 S.Ct. 507 (2017).
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5.3. No-Poaching Agreements: Wyckoff v. Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball72
At issue in this case were the formal (i.e., contractual) and informal restraints 
in the market for baseball scouts employed by MLB clubs. The 30 MLB clubs 
employ over 1,000 scouts. These scouts travel all over the U.S. and to some 
foreign countries to evaluate baseball talent. They attend high school, college, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
The scouts report their evaluations to the club that employs them and the clubs 
rely on those scouting reports to select players to hire. In this regard, scouting 
services are valuable to the clubs. 
Baseball scouts are hired by the MLB clubs, which use a uniform employee 
contract. All MLB clubs use this uniform contract, which is prescribed by the 
commissioner. Ordinarily, these are one-year contracts and contain an exclusivity 
provision. During the term of the contract, a scout may not provide scouting ser-
vices to any other club. The uniform contract also has an anti-tampering provision. 
When a scout is under contract, he or she may not negotiate future employment 
with any other club unless he or she has been given permission to do so. 
Jordan Wyckoff and a number of other baseball scouts alleged that the clubs 
agreed among themselves on a salary structure that depressed compensation 
below competitive levels.73 In addition, they alleged that the anti-tampering or 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????74 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief.75 The district court grant-
ed the motion to dismiss since it decided that Wyckoff could not meet his burden 
of proof under Supreme Court precedent, Ninth Circuit precedent, and the Curt 
Flood Act.76
No-poaching agreements are not necessary for the success of MLB. They 
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????????
ancillary agreements that promote the larger venture (i.e., MLB itself). In other 
words, no-poaching agreements do not contribute to the production of MLB 
games for public consumption.
72  ????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2016 U.S. Dist LEXIS 135443 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016)
73? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
he often worked more than 40 hours in a week. Id. at 620.
74  All of the major sports leagues have restrictions on poaching or tampering with personnel 
under contract. For an evaluation of this restraint see Roger D. Blair. & John E. Lopatka, The 
Economic Effects of Anti-Tampering Rules in Professional Sports Leagues, 38 MANAGERIAL AND 
DECISION ECONOMICS 704, (2017). 
75? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for relief that is plausible on its face. Failure to satisfy this pleading requirement is grounds for 
dismissal. Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
76  Cert was denied for this case. ????????????????????????????????????????????????? 138 S.Ct. 
2621, (2018).
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5.4. Broadcasting Restraints: Garber v. Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball77
Not all recent decisions have gone MLB’s way. In Garber, the district court 
agreed that monopolistic restraints in broadcasting MLB games fell outside the 
scope of MLB’s antitrust exemption.
In order to maximize the value of broadcast licenses, MLB carved up the 
country into exclusive home territories for each club.78 Each club was then able 
to license its TV broadcast rights to a regional sports network (RSN). The RSN 
then sold the programming to cable and satellite companies for resale to their 
subscribers. In doing so, MLB created a series of local monopolies. As a result, 
a Royals fan who lives in the Royals’ home territory could not view the Royals’ 
away games because of exclusivity provisions in the license agreements. Simi-
larly, a Yankees fan who lives in the Royals’ home territory could not view the 
Yankees’ home games. Thus, a Yankees fan could only watch the Yankees play 
when they play against the Royals. Again, this was due to exclusivity provisions 
that protect the local monopoly, but it left some unmet demand. MLB stepped in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ??????
access to out-of-market games, could subscribe to MLB Extra Innings for cable 
access or to MLB.TV for Internet streaming. By imposing a variety of restraints, 
MLB and its members were able to restrict choices and charge monopoly prices.
????????? ???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ing that MLB’s exclusive agreements and restrictions violated the Sherman Act. 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exemption. The district court denied the motion and held that the geographic 
division of broadcast territories did not fall within the business of baseball that is 
covered by the exemption.
The case settled before going to trial. The settlement provided expanded 
choices to fans and reduced prices.79
It is somewhat unfortunate that the case settled before the district court’s 
ruling on the applicability of MLB’s antitrust exemption could be reviewed. The 
settlement vacates all of the rulings and, therefore, Garber has no precedential 
value. The ruling in Garber does suggest, however, that some judges are willing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
77  ???????????????????????????????????????????????? 120 F. Supp. 3d 334, Dist. Court, SD New 
York (2017).
78  The exceptions then included Chicago, New York, and San Francisco.
79  For a brief discussion of the terms of the settlement, see Sports Illustrated article, ??????
League Baseball Settles Lawsuit over Television Blackouts. Available at https://www.si.com/
mlb/2016/01/19/garber-case-settlement-tv-packages. For more detail, David Fucillo (2016) MLB.
TV Lawsuit Settlement Means Cheaper Extra Innings, MLB.TV Packages. SBNation. Available 
at https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2016/2/11/10966352/mlb-tv-lawsuit-settlement-details-extra-in-
nings-mlb-tv-packages-cheaper
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5.5. Summary
The results of recent antitrust challenges suggest that MLB’s antitrust exemption 
is secure. Plaintiffs have offered creative arguments in their efforts to distinguish 
Federal Baseball and its progeny, but most lower courts are following precedents 
that have no economic foundation. What appears to be necessary is a Supreme 
Court that will reconsider Federal Baseball and correct its error, which is nearly 
100 years old. 
6. Judicial Resistance to Repeal of Federal Baseball
Justice Holmes erred badly in Federal Baseball nearly 100 years ago by granting 
antitrust immunity to MLB. This special treatment has not been extended to any 
other sports league or organization, nor should it be.80 At a time when the DOJ is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
MLB continues to be free to engage in these monopsonistic practices. 
There is no legitimate rationale for MLB’s antitrust exemption and it should 
be withdrawn. This can be accomplished judicially or legislatively. 
The Supreme Court has already acknowledged that Federal Baseball was a 
mistake. In Flood??????????????????????????????????????????????????stare decisis (i.e., 
respect for precedent) and inaction by Congress. Neither should be a barrier to a 
sensible and consistent antitrust policy. 
6.1. The Stare Decisis Trap
Judicial respect for precedent is important for the stability of our legal system. If 
earlier decisions have no precedential value, then no one will know what conduct 
is permissible and what is not. The resulting uncertainty impedes transactions 
???? ???????????? ????? ???? ????????????? ????????81 to the detriment of social 
welfare. At the same time, stare decisis can trap society in a sub-optimal state if 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In the case of Federal Baseball, even the Supreme Court acknowledges that 
it was wrongly decided. In Flood, for example, the Court recognized that 
1. “Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate 
commerce.” 
2. “With its reserve system enjoying immunity from the federal 
antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception 
80  Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) and Haywood v. National Basket-
ball Assn., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
81  Economists have long recognized that interpersonal welfare comparisons are impossible, so it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a change could compensate the losers and still come out ahead, that change is said to be Kalder-
?????????????????????????????????????Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 549 (1939), and J.R. Hicks: Foundations of Welfare 
Economics, 49 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 696 (1939). 
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and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an 
????????????????????????????????82
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court concluded that “[e]ven though others 
might regard this as ‘unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,’ … the aberration is 
an established one…”83 Consequently, the Supreme Court did nothing to correct 
the error that it committed in Federal Baseball. 
In spite of its general respect for precedent, the Supreme Court does correct 
its past blunders from time to time. Its decision in Continental T.V.84 overruled 
its Schwinn85 precedent. It overruled Albrecht86 in State Oil87 and overruled Dr. 
Miles88 in Leegin.89 Thus, the Court’s adherence to its precedents is far from 
absolute. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be invariably anticompetitive where subsequent economic analysis found that not 
to be so. In the case of MLB’s exemption, the Court would be subjecting MLB to 
the same antitrust rules as all other sports leagues. 
Since the Flood decision in 1972, there have been many antitrust challenges 
to the anticompetitive conduct by MLB. All of them have been stymied by the 
Federal Baseball precedent. The courts will continue to have opportunities to 
correct the error of Federal Baseball. This is the way that the law evolves. 
The evolutionary models of legal change suggest that precedents that are 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ????
exceed the losses to the losers.90? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
on Kaldor-Hicks grounds since it permits both monopolistic and monopsonistic 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????Flood, the Court unambiguous-
ly said that it would not overrule Federal Baseball, but would leave it to Congress 
to correct the Court’s errs regarding MLB’s exemption. Since Flood is 47 years 
old, the Court’s determination to do nothing may have waned. Consequently, 
??? ??? ?????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????
antitrust challenges, there would be no opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
change course and overrule Federal Baseball.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
82  Flood, 407 U.S. at 2105. 
83  Id. at 2107.
84  Continental T.V., Inc v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
85  United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
86  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
87  State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 U.S. 275 (1997).
88  Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
89  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., v. PSKS, Inc. 127 U.S. 2705 (2007).
90  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1973), observed that the common law evolved 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 51 (1977), and George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1984) formalized Posner’s observation.
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6.2. Congressional Inaction
There is ample evidence that Congress was well aware of MLB’s antitrust 
exemption. With the exception of the Curt Flood Act, Congress has been a pillar 
of inaction. Given the political process, this is not too surprising. Congress is 
vulnerable to determined lobbying efforts.91 Those with much to gain (or lose) 
???? ????? ??? ????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????????????? ???
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
scouts, umpires, and minor league players, are small in number or politically 
unconnected. To the extent that fans are victims, they are vast in number, their 
injury may be substantial in the aggregate, but diffused. Put differently, each 
fan’s injury will be small and not worth pursuing vigorously.
In Toolson and again in Flood, the Supreme Court rationalized its own inac-
tion in failing to correct its Federal Baseball mishap by pointing to Congress’s 
inaction in not legislatively overturning Federal Baseball. This seems a bit odd. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
Sherman Act. Although it was the Court that created the MLB exemption, the 
Court holds Congress responsible for undoing the exemption. We think that this 
responsibility is misplaced.
7. Proposed Reform: Withdraw MLB’s  
Antitrust Exemption
There is no obvious reason why MLB’s antitrust exemption should not be 
withdrawn. The original rationale for antitrust immunity was jurisdictional—
MLB was not engaged in “trade or commerce” and what it was engaged in 
???? ???? ????????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ????? ????? ????? ???????????
Consequently, the Supreme Court could revisit Federal Baseball and simply 
overrule it. Alternatively, Congress could expand the coverage of the Curt Flood 
Act to include the business of baseball. In either case, MLB and its member clubs 
would still have to impose a variety of restraints if they are going to produce 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
under the rule of reason. Those restraints that are procompetitive on balance 
would be permissible while those that are not would be unlawful.
It is generally understood that sports leagues must collaborate on many di-
mensions. These include rules of play, roster size, equipment, schedules, playoff 
structure, and championships. The absence of agreements on these issues would 
result in confusion and reduce fan satisfaction. Cooperation would seem to be 
procompetitive and, therefore, desirable.
There are a host of current restraints, however, that would not pass muster 
under the rule of reason. Agreements that restrain competition in labor markets 
91? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The Theory of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 2 THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 3 (1971) and Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 211 
(1976).
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would be hard to justify.92 Horizontal agreements among the MLB clubs re-
stricting competition for major league players, minor league players, umpires, 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
Consequently, without more, these agreements would violate §1 of the Sherman 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
offset the anticompetitive effects. MLB and its members might turn to competitive 
balance as a rationale for collusion, but this argument should fail. First, there is 
no conclusive evidence that fans actually care about competitive balance. For 
instance, fans of a lower-ranked team may simply want to see the well-known 
players from the top teams even though the uncertainty of the game result is very 
low.93 Second, neither depressing salaries directly by exercising monopsony power 
nor doing so indirectly by curtailing free agency will improve competitive bal-
ance.94 Consequently, this argument should be rejected in a rule of reason analysis. 
8. Conclusion
Nearly 100 years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes stumbled in his Federal Baseball 
opinion and exempted MLB from antitrust scrutiny. In subsequent decisions—
Toolson and Flood—the Court recognized its earlier mistake, but refused to 
correct it. The time has come for the Court to review the unwarranted exemption 
and subject the business of baseball to the same rules that govern the conduct of the 
92  In a speech at the Economic Policy Institute and Open Markets Institute conference, FTC 
Commissioner Rohit Chopra called for more attention to employer conduct that limits compen-
sation and other terms of employment. Available at ??????????????????????????????????????????
public_statements/1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf
93  The empirical evidence of the impact of competitive balance on fan demand has been mixed. 
Earlier papers such as Glenn Knowles, Keith Sherony, & Mike Haupert, ??????????????? ?????
League Baseball: A Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis, 36 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST 
72 (1992), and Daniel A. Rascher, A Test of the Optimal Positive Production Network Externality 
??? ????????????????????? in John Fizel, Elizabeth Gustafson, & Lawrence Hadley, eds., Sports 
Economics: Current Research 27???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????-
dance. More recent papers such as James W Meehan., Randy A. Nelson, & Thomas V. Richard-
son, ??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? 8 JOURNAL OF SPORTS 
ECONOMICS 563 (2007), Brian Soebbing, ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
Baseball: An Empirical Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis, 3 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF SPORT FINANCE 119, (2008). Scott Tainsky & Jason Winfree, Short-Run Demand and Uncer-
????????????????????? ??????????????????????37 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 197 (2010), 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
current standings of the teams, the importance of the game in qualifying for playoffs, the team’s 
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other sports leagues and organizations. Neither stare decisis nor Congressional 
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put an end to it. Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that “it is revolting to have 
no better reason for a rule of law than that is was so laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from the blind imitation of 
the past”.95 Presumably, Holmes would apply this bit of wisdom to his ruling in 
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